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IF NOT HERE, WHERE?: WIRELESS FACILITY SITING
AND SECTION 332(c)(7) OF THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
When Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the
"1996 Act" or "Act"), it sought to balance a number of competing inter-
ests in an attempt to revolutionize the way that the government ap-
proaches telecommunications in the United States. The goal of the 1996
Act is a seamless telecommunications network linking communities to-
gether and providing "a pro-competitive, deregulatory national policy
framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of
advanced telecommunications and information technologies and serv-
ices ... by opening all telecommunications markets to competition .... I
One of the problems facing Congress was rapidly evolving technology
coupled with exponentially increasing demand for wireless personal
communications services ("PCS"). 2 A rollout of competing telecommu-
nications infrastructures, 3 specifically tower facilities, was required in or-
der to permit telecommunications providers to satisfy the demand.
Providers use a "hexagonal cell structure" to maximize service cov-
erage with the fewest number of towers, but have limited flexibility in
where to place the towers.4 This limitation is coupled with the fact that
the new digital technology requires four times the number of transmis-
1 H.R. CONF. RP. No. 104-458, at 206 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,
124.
2 See Dean J. Donatelli, Note, Locating Cellular Telephone Facilities: How Should
Communities Answer When Cellular Telephone Companies Call?, 27 RuTrGERs LJ. 447, 448
(1996) (discussing the rapid increase in demand and the dilemma that is created between meet-
ing that demand and satisfying community concerns regarding aesthetics and property values);
see also Nancy M. Palermo, Comment, Progress Before Pleasure: Balancing the Competing
Interests of Telecommunications Companies and Landowners in Cell Site Construction, 16
TEMp. ENVTL. L. & TEmc. J. 245, 245 (1998) (discussing the explosive growth in industry).
Interestingly, some commentators argue that "both Congress and the Court... often use
technological change either as a catalyst or as a pawn, and in both instances the connection to
the past is at least as important as the aspiration to the future." Monroe E. Price & John F.
Duffy, Technological Change and Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Con-
gress and the Court, 97 COLuM. L. REv. 976, 981 (1997).
3 See David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to Which Communities Will
Climb to Prevent the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. CoRp. L. 469, 470 (1998). Personal
wireless facilities referenced in the Act, include transmitters, antenna structures and other
types of installations. FEDERAL. Co muNIcxGnoNs Com ussioN, Fact Sheet #2: National Wire-
less Facilities Siting Policies (Sept. 17, 1996). Personal communications services ("PCS"),
includes a variety of services, such as digital voice, date and paging transmissions over the
same spectrum. See id.
4 See Hughes, supra note 3, at 484 (noting that the average cost to build a wireless
tower site is approximately $550,000).
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sion towers as the older cellular technology, almost literally putting facil-
ities in every backyard. 5 Congress aptly recognized that allowing
wireless service providers to place a 150- to 250-foot tower in every city,
town, and village could prove difficult. After all, these localities have
increasingly become environmentally conscious and zealous in their zon-
ing decisions, not to mention the sense that a community's political pro-
cess may not be representative of the surrounding population or that
certain interests may have co-opted the process entirely.6
How was Congress supposed to balance the rush to market competi-
tion and efficiency with communities' schizophrenic desire to take ad-
vantage of these new technologies, while also exerting control over
tower siting decisions or even turning down the encroachment of towers
in their backyards? 7 Unfortunately, rather than providing a solution,
Congress gored itself on the horns of this dilemma by failing to satisfy
any of the demands. The 1996 Act's provisions on tower siting are am-
biguous and invite, rather than thwart, litigation. The Act puts providers,
who have paid significant amounts for a license from the Federal Com-
munications Commission ("FCC"), in the difficult position of having to
negotiate hundreds of different local zoning rules with "an unclear stat-
ute, and no standard from the courts" for guidance as they try to compete
with existing providers.8 The 1996 Act's tower siting provisions also
raise a number of issues regarding the interaction between local decision
making and federal oversight. The Second Circuit recently noted in frus-
tration that the "statute fairly bristles with potential issues."9 Exacerbat-
ing the problem are courts' erroneous and misleading interpretations of
the statute. When hearing section 332(c)(7) cases, many courts run
5 See Jeneba Jalloh, Local Tower Siting Preemption: FCC Radio Frequency Guidelines
are Solution for Removing Barriers to PCS Expansion, 5 CoMMLAW CONSPECSUS 113, 113
(1997) "Moving an antenna just a few feet can affect a PCS network ability to provide even
coverage throughout the service area." Id. Because a location is likely to be appropriate for
any companies providing similar wireless services in an area, some landowners express con-
cern over "tower farms" growing in their neighborhoods. See Claire Levy, Zoning for Cellular
Towers Under Current Regulatory Conditions, 27 CoLo. LAW. 75, 75 (1998).
6 See Jeffrey Silva, Kennard Reaffirms Tower Siting Stance, RCR RADIo Comm. REP.,
March 16, 1998; Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Two Cheers for Shifting the Pre-
sumption of Validity: A Reply to Professor Hopperton, 24 B.C. ENvr.. AFF. L. Rv. 103, 106
(1996); see also Gregory M. Kratofil, Jr., Note, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and
Section 704: A "Boom" or "Bust" for the Mobile Telephone Industry, 16 ST. Lotus U. PuB. L.
REv. 499, 517 ("Unfortunately, [zoning boards] all over the country have been actively dis-
criminating against new cellular providers in the name of... NIMBYism.").
7 See Susan Lorde Martin, Communications Tower Sitings: The Telecommunications
Act of 1996 and the Battle for Community Control, 12 BERKELEY TEmc. L.J. 483, 486 (1997)
(noting that while cellular phones have become very popular since their introduction in 1983,
most people are unwilling to ask for the best coverage "if the price is living next to, or within
viewing distance of, a tower").
8 Kratofil, supra note 6, at 514.
9 Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1999).
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roughshod over traditional administrative law and federalism concerns,
rather than heeding time-tested methods of judicial deference.
To effectuate this delicate balancing act, Congress included section
704, entitled "Preservation of Local Zoning Authority," in the 1996 Act,
which added a new subsection (c)(7) to section 332 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934:
(A) General Authority. Except as provided in this para-
graph, nothing in this Act shall limit or affect the
authority of a State or local government or instru-
mentality thereof over decisions regarding the
placement, construction, and modification of per-
sonal wireless service facilities.
(B) Limitations
(i) The regulation of the placement, construction,
and modification of personal wireless services
facilities by any State or local government or
instrumentality thereof
(I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among
providers of functionally equivalent serv-
ices; and
(11) shall not prohibit or have the effect of
prohibiting the provision of personal wire-
less services.
(ii) A State or local government or instrumentality
thereof shall act on any request for authoriza-
tion to place, construct, or modify personal
wireless facilities within a reasonable period of
time after the request is duly filed with such
government or instrumentality, taking into ac-
count the nature and scope of such request.
(iii) Any decision by a State or local government or
instrumentality thereof to deny a request to
place, construct, or modify personal wireless
service facilities shall be in writing and sup-
ported by substantial evidence contained in a
written record.
No state or local government or instrumentality
thereof may regulate the placement, construction,
and modification of personal wireless service facili-
ties on the basis of the environmental effects of ra-
dio frequency emissions to the extent that such
facilities comply with the Commission regulations
concerning such emissions.
1999]
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Any person adversely affected by any final action or
failure to act by a State or local government or any
instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with this
subparagraph may, within 30 days after such action
or failure to act, commence an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction. The court shall hear and de-
cide such action on an expedited basis. Any person
adversely affected by an act or failure to act by a
State or local government or any instrumentality
thereof that is inconsistent with clause (iv) may peti-
tion the Commission for relief.'0
Unfortunately, the universal conclusion has been that "[tihis new
[subsection] is vague in its reach and implications and serves as the
source for political, economic, and emotional turmoil for the wireless
industry and communities alike."" Disputes over tower siting arose im-
mediately.12 Providers, who had invested millions to garner the neces-
sary licenses from the FCC,13 pushed hard to install the necessary
hardware.' 4 In most areas, the result was acquiescence by the locality, 15
but in other areas citizens and providers have waged costly battles. 16 As
10 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, codified at 47
U.S.C. § 332(c)(7). While the Act was only enacted in February of 1996, the role of the
federal government in communications in this country is founded in the Radio Act of 1927,
which allowed the government to declare ownership of the radio frequency spectrum and pre-
empt conflicting local regulations. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 472-73. The Radio Act was
eventually replaced with the Communications Act of 1934, which created the Federal Commu-
nications Commission. See id. This was further amended by the 1996 Act. See id
11 Hughes, supra note 3, at 474; see also John M. Wilson, II, Local Control Over the
Siting of Cellular Towers, 13 MuN. L. 1, 1 (1999) (noting that these provisions "have been
litigated with sufficient frequency (and sometimes ferocity) that zoning officials could fairly
wonder whether the exceptions might sometimes have begun to swallow the general rule pre-
serving local zoning authority.").
12 See Sprint Spectrum v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Wash. 1996). The
City of Medina enacted a moratorium on tower construction five days after the Telecommuni-
cations Act became effective. See id. at 1037. Sprint filed suit one month later, arguing that
the moratorium violated the Act and would cause it to lose a significant amount of money. See
id. The court held that the City's conduct did not violate the Act nor should the Act be read as
giving preferential treatment to the wireless industry in the processing of zoning applications.
See id. at 1040.
13 For example, in 1997, SprintCom purchased licenses in excess of $123 million to
provide personal wireless services in the Chicago area. See SprintCom v. Village of
Mundelein, No. 98-CV-4451, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20397, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 1998).
14 See Roger P. Downes, A Question of Balance, Wmnss Rav., Dec. 1, 1998.
15 See FCC, Industry Groups Hammer Out Tower Siting Agreement, Comm. TODAY,
Aug. 6, 1998. The approximately 300 pending applications are only a small percentage of the
36,000 local government units in the country. See id.
16 See Silva, supra note 6 (describing "war" being waged by citizens to preserve Buffalo
Mountain, in Hardwick Vermont, which is on the town's seal and on which a 150-foot tele-
communications tower is proposed); see also John Sullivan, Nice Neighborhood Ya Got Here.
It'd Be A Shame If Something Was to... Happen to it, MOBILE PHoNE NEws, September 21,
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one PCS industry commentator noted, "[t]he wireless industry... in one
bold stroke.... managed to make resistance to the wireless industry by
whatever means necessary an act of patriotic heroism."'17
Part I of this Note discusses the Congressional preservation of local
zoning powers in the amended section 332(c)(7). This provision has
spawned considerable debate over whether the limitations on local zon-
ing authority should be read narrowly, so as to reflect the presumed in-
tent of the provision, or whether the limitations should be read broadly,
thereby reflecting the intent to pave the way for the seamless telecommu-
nications network that is the overall purpose of the Telecommunications
Act.' 8 This Note argues that the former interpretation should be adopted
because zoning issues are inherently local and because Congress did not
provide an express grant of broad powers or preemption. Ultimately,
Congress should not have left it to the courts to resolve these disputes.
Part II discusses how Congress exacerbated the problem by poorly draft-
ing the relevant provisions. Part III addresses what remedy, in light of
the Act's silence on the issue, is appropriate for violations of the statu-
tory provisions.
I. THE ACT PRESERVES LOCAL AUTHORITY
The plain language of the Act preserves state and local zoning au-
thority over .the placement and construction of wireless communication
facilities. Section 332(c)(7) is even entitled "Preservation of Local Zon-
ing Authority."'19 Courts have taken notice of the title, as well as the
Act's qualifying language that introduces this section of the Act.20 The
specific language unequivocally provides that, except for the specific
procedural limitations included in section 332(c)(7)(B), "nothing in this
Act shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or
instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construc-
tion, and modification of personal wireless service facilities."'21 The ex-
1998 (commenting on wireless providers' strong arm tactics in installing towers). Sullivan
relates how, in Brookhaven, PA., Bell Atlantic is suing the town for denying a permit to build
a tower on land owned by a synagogue, and bringing civil rights charges against individual
council members, in addition to sending threatening letters to everyone who spoke against the
proposed tower site. See id. Sullivan quotes one woman as stating: "My husband and I are
probably going to chain ourselves to the synagogue gate. It's gone beyond just a cell phone
issue. It's gone to what I think this country should stand for." Id.
17 Sullivan, supra note 16.
18 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 206 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
124, 124.
19 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (1998).
20 See, e.g., Cellco Partnership v. Russell, No. 1:98CV23, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11639,
at *13 (W.D.N.C. June 24, 1998) ("The express reservation of local regulatory authority indi-
cates an intent that the limitations on that power not be granted an overly expansive construc-
tion by the courts.").
21 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A).
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press reservation of local regulatory authority indicates the
Congressional intent that the limitation on local power not be granted an
overly expansive construction by the courts. 22 Many of the courts re-
viewing a claim pursuant to this section have acknowledged this basic
principle of statutory interpretation,2 though some have forgotten it on
the way to significantly limiting the zoning discretion of localities.
The legislative history of section 332(c)(7) also indicates that Con-
gress rejected total federal preemption of tower siting.24 The Conference
Committee decided instead to only partially preempt local tower siting
decisions as they relate to radio frequency ("RF') emissions.25 In adopt-
ing the Act, Congress also expressly directed the FCC to terminate all
rulemaking concerning preemption of local zoning authority, thereby
precluding the Commission from intervening in zoning matters related to
the placement and construction of communications towers.26 Congress
thus considered and rejected any attempt to federalize or replace local
authority to site wireless communications facilities. While the courts
have acknowledged that the Act only selectively preempts local author-
ity,27 constituencies outside the judiciary continue to argue in favor of
federalization.
Wireless providers' claimed right to usurpation of local powers es-
sentially rests on a single principle: because Congress, in the 1996 Act,
intended to promote competition among wireless service providers, this
general competitive goal overwhelms local land use regulation, including
zoning and environmental assessment controls.28 This position is con-
22 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739-40 (1989) (when a general policy
is qualified by an exception, the Court "usually read[s] the exception narrowly in order to
preserve the primary operation of the [policy].").
23 See Cellco, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11639, at *13; see also Omnipoint Communications,
Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 1:CV-97-1589, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3789 (M.D. Pa. March
24, 1998); Sprint Spectrum v. City of Woburn, 8 F. Supp. 2d 118 (D. Mass. 1998); Sprint
Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Wash. 1996); AT&T Wireless
Serv. v. Orange County, 928 F. Supp. 856, 860 (M.D. Fla. 1997); AT&T Wireless PCS v. City
Council of Virginia Beach, 979 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Va. 1997).
24 See H.R. 1555, 103d Cong. § 107(a) (1995).
25 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 206 (1996). The Act prohibits regulation of
wireless towers "on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the
extent that such facilities comply with the Commission's regulations concerning such emis-
sions." 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (1998).
26 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458.
27 See, e.g., BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Gwinnett County, 944 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Ga.
1996).
28 See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 24, Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Wilioth, 996 F.
Supp. 253 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing preamble to Act); see also 141 CONG. Rac. 149,954 (1996)
(Representative Bliley stated that the Act reflects Congress' recognition that "full competition
must be the end result of any attempts at telecommunications reform."). In a speech to tele-
communications providers, the Chairman of the FCC, William Kennard, stated that
"[clompetition is certainly the driving force in the wireless industry.... Wireless is the poster
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trary to the plain language of the Act, its legislative history, and the tradi-
tional role of localities in land use and zoning matters. Even absent
complete preemption, the issue is distilled to one of degree, of how much
control over facility siting is reserved to the localities.
For example, the Personal Communications Industry Association
("PCIA") and others argue for imposition of federal preemption of local
land use decisions by citing specific legislative decisions on federal pre-
emption in other discrete areas of telecommunications policy and apply-
ing them to tower siting.29 A reasoned interpretation of these other
provisions, however, further establishes that Congress preserved local
authority over the siting of wireless service facilities in section
332(c)(7). 30 Proponents cite section 253 and section 332(c)(3) of the
Act, which govern the provision of services rather than the regulation of
tower siting, in support of the argument that Congress indirectly pre-
empted rather than preserved traditional zoning practices during local re-
view of siting applications. Section 253 relates to prohibitions on the
provision of telecommunications services. 31 Similarly, section 332(c)(3)
relates to entry regulations concerning commercial or private mobile ra-
dio services. 32 Congress has authorized the FCC to preempt local regula-
tions with regard to local statutes or regulations which, "prohibit the
ability of an entity to provide ... telecommunications service.''33 How-
ever, section 332(c)(7) of the Act expressly preserves local authority to
make decisions regarding the siting of facilities.34 While Congress did
preempt state and local authority over rate or entry regulation on private
land mobile service and commercial mobile services, it specifically au-
thorized continued state and local regulation of the "terms and condi-
tions" of such services, including facility siting issues (e.g., zoning).35
The 1996 Act did not change the fact that local regulation of terms and
conditions of service, including facility siting issues, was preserved in
1993. Congress' appreciation for a preservation of the distinction be-
tween "services" on the one hand and "facilities" on the other allows the
introduction of competitive telecommunications services while maintain-
child for competition." William Kennard, Crossing into the Wireless Century (visited Apr. 3,
1999) <http:lwww.fcc.gov/SpeecheslKennardlspwek906.html>.
29 See PCIA Brief for Amicus Curiae for Appellant at 4-6, Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v.
Willoth, No. 98-7442 (2d Cir. 1998).
30 See AT&T Wireless Serv. v. Orange County, 928 F. Supp. 856, 861 (M.D. Fla. 1997)
(finding that "it is clear that the Act was not intended to completely preempt the authority of
local governments to regulate, to some extent, the placement and construction of cellular
towers.").
31 See 47 U.S.C. § 253 (1998).
32 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3) (1998).
33 Id. (emphasis added).
34 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7).
35 See H.R. REP. No. 103-111 (1993).
1999]
396 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 8:389
ing local control over the intrusion of physical facilities. FCC authority
to license providers should not, therefore, by itself, be read as preempting
local zoning regulations. 36 Congress did not intend for section 332(c)(7)
to be superseded by "implication," as proponents of preemption argue.
Since Congress has not authorized the preemption of local regulations
concerning the siting of facilities, Wireless providers should not be per-
mitted to bootstrap additional power based on these other provisions so
as to achieve through judicial fiat what they could not gain through the
legislative process.
Furthermore, land use issues are a local concern within the federal-
ism framework because these issues frequently turn on "local variation[s]
interpreted in local settings."' 37 There is also a desire to avoid disrupting
local government or causing needless frictions between local and federal
authorities. 38 State and local legislation and regulations may only be pre-
empted in limited circumstances where Congress intended, and clearly
signaled its intent, that federal law should cover the entire field of regula-
tion. The federal preemption doctrine provides that federal law may pre-
empt state or municipal law when Congress so states in explicit terms on
the face of a statute, when federal legislation is so comprehensive in a
given case so as to leave no room for supplemental state or local legisla-
tion, or when local law actually conflicts with federal law or congres-
sional purposes or goals.39 Not only has Congress refused to grant such
power to wireless service providers in this instance, it has expressly pre-
served local zoning authority.
Wireless providers and other proponents are seeking support from
the courts to empower private telecommunication providers to infringe
on a traditional attribute of state sovereignty-land use regulation-
without express legislative support. Instead, their argument is based
upon the promise of competition that pervades the penumbra of the Act.
The Supreme Court has noted that the regulation of land use is a function
"traditionally performed by local government." 4° Since there is no ex-
36 See Jaymes D. Littlejohn, The Impact of Land Use Regulation on Cellular Communi-
cations: Is Federal Preemption Warranted?, 45 FED. Comm. L.J. 247, 259 (1993). Another
way to think about it is, "[w]here federal and state or local enactments overlap in their effects
on non-governmental activities, the proper judicial approach is to reconcile the operation of
both statutory schemes rather than hold one completely ineffectual." 3 EDWARD H. ZmEGLER,
RATHKOPF'S TBE LAw oF ZONING AND PLANNING, § 31.05 (1998) cited in Littlejohn, supra.
37 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959) (discuss-
ing the local nexus of such issues in the context of eminent domain); see also Hess v. Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994).
38 See Louisiana Power & Light Co., 360 U.S. at 28.
39 See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987) (citing Hilisbor-
ough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)).
40 Hess, 513 U.S. at 30; see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. The opinions of
other justices also supports this general proposition. For example, Justice Thomas, joined by
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, noted in dissent that:
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plicit statement or comprehensive regulatory scheme enacted by Con-
gress that local decisions are to be preempted by the FCC or wireless
providers in connection with local zoning and siting matters, it would be
entirely inconsistent for a court to effectively grant extrastatutory pre-
emptive rights to providers. Moreover, without Congressional authoriza-
tion in the Act for companies to preempt local zoning laws, the
providers' position violates the terms of the Act. Considering the ambi-
guity of the Act's provisions on this issue and the high stakes, it should
not be surprising that the telecommunications industry is pushing the Act
to its limits.
II. POOR DRAFTING EXACERBATES THE PROBLEM
While the Act imposes three major limitations on local decision
making,4 1 only one has proven to be the providers' sword and the locali-
ties' burden. The Act provides that "[a]ny decision by a State or local
government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, con-
struct, or modify personal wireless services facilities shall be in writing
and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record." 42
The requirement that decisions be both in "in writing" and supported by
"substantial evidence," incorporates elements of administrative law not
necessarily found at the local level.43 This is further exacerbated by the
lack of guidance provided by Congress on what those terms actually
mean.44 Indeed, most of the cases turn on the court's interpretation of
these standards. 45
It is obvious that land use-the subject of petitioner's zoning code-is an area tradi-
tionally regulated by the States rather than by Congress, and that land use regulation
is one of the historic powers of the States. As we have stated, "zoning laws and their
provisions . . . are peculiarly within the province of state and local legislative
authorities:'
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 744 (1995) (citing Wirth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 508 n.18 (1975); Hess, 513 U.S. at 30; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,767 n.30
(1982) ("Regulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity."); Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J. dissenting) ("I am in full agreement with
the majority that zoning... may indeed be the most essential function performed by local
government.")).
41 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
42 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (1998).
43 See Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490,495 (2d Cir. 1999)(noting
the higher scrutiny the Act imposes above that ordinarily applied in judicial review of local
land use decisions).
44 While there is inevitable imprecision in language and limits upon human foresight and
legislators cannot resolve all issues in advance, see Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND.
L. REv. 395,400 (1950), Congress did have the ability to contemplate the ensuing debate over
this issue. See id
45 See, e.g., Omnipoint Corp. v. Pine Grove Township, 20 F. Supp. 2d 875 (E.D. Pa.
1998); Cellco Partnership v. Farmington, 3 F. Supp. 2d 178 (D. Conn. 1998); Virginia Me-
tronet, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 984 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Va. 1998); AT&T Wireless PCS,
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In addition to the above-mentioned limitations, section 332(c)(7)
provides that localities shall not "unreasonably discriminate among prov-
iders of functionally equivalent services," or "prohibit or have the effect
of prohibiting the provision of wireless services," and requires that local-
ities act upon requests "within a reasonable period. '46 While these pro-
visions have also been litigated,47 the "in writing and supported by
substantial evidence" requirement has proven to be more troublesome
and open to ongoing debate. Therefore, this note will only focus on the
writing and evidence requirements.
As of this writing, three Circuits have issued decisions interpreting
the "in writing and supported substantial evidence" requirement.48 In the
first, AT&T Wireless PCS v. Virginia Beach,49 the Fourth Circuit re-
versed a fairly sweeping district court decision holding that the defendant
had violated every procedural requirement of section 332(c)(7). 50 The
Fourth Circuit's decision recast the more strict standards of review used
by many lower courts, holding instead that a more deferential standard of
review is appropriate.51 In the second case, Cellular Telephone Co. v.
Oyster Bay,52 the Second Circuit agonized over the appropriate statutory
interpretation. In the end, the court neither adopted nor rejected the
Fourth Circuit's deferential approach, on its way to affirming summary
Inc. v. City of Chamblee, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1997); OPM-USA, Inc. v. Brevard
County, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Illinois RSA No. 3 v. County of Peoria, 963 F.
Supp. 732 (C.D. 11. 1997); Western PCS II, Corp. v. Extraterritorial Zoning Authority, 957 F.
Supp. 1230 (D.N.M. 1997); BellSouth Mobility v. Gwinnett County, 944 F. Supp. 923 (N.D.
Ga. 1996).
46 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)-(ii).
47 See, e.g., Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Easton, 982 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding
that town unreasonably discriminated among providers); Western PCS II, 957 F. Supp. 1230
(involving claims alleging violations of all of the limitations).
48 The First Circuit also has addressed the issue, but only in dicta. See Town of Amherst
v. Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc., No. 98-2061, 1999 WL 174253 (1' Cir.
March 30, 1999). The court reversed the trial court's decision in favor of the plaintiff-pro-
vider, finding instead that the town had not effectively prohibited wireless services. See id. at
*5. The court went on to briefly discuss the question of substantial evidence and its relation-
ship to other provisions of the Act, in anticipation of it arising on remand. See id. at *7. The
court noted that while the substantial evidence test "involves some deference but also.., some
bite," Omnipoint's chances for succeeding on this claim were limited. Id.
49 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998).
50 AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Virginia Beach, 979 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Va. 1997) rev'd,
155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998).
51 While most subsequent decisions have followed the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the
"in writing" requirement, courts have been more reluctant to adopt the more deferential sub-
stantial evidence standard. See, e.g., Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490,
495-96 (2d Cir. 1999); Iowa Wireless Serv., L.P. v. City of Moline, No. 98-4090, 1998 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 19542 (C.D. 11. Nov. 10, 1998); Petersburg Cellular Partnership v. Bd. of Supervi-
sors, No. 3:98cv503, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19720 (E.D. Va. Dec. 14, 1998); cf. SprintCom v.
City of Cumming, No. 2:98-CV-WCO, U.S. Dist. Lexis 18523 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 1998).
52 166 F.3d 490 (2nd Cir. 1999).
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judgment for the plaintiff-provider.53 Finally, the Seventh Circuit, in
Aegerton v. City of Delafield,54 rejected the Fourth Circuit's parsing of
the traditional substantial evidence standard, but nonetheless affirmed the
district court's judgment in favor of the locality.55
A. IN WRITING
The Seventh Circuit noted that the Fourth Circuit broke sharply with
prior district court decisions on the "in writing" requirement.5 6 The dis-
trict courts had generally held that a decision was not "in writing" if the
locality relied on a post-appeal transcript of the proceedings or merely
provided cursory explanation of their decision, on the theory that the
requirement was necessary to "permit a reviewing court to ascertain the
rationale behind a denial .... -57 A decision must, therefore, include the
reasons for denial, a written decision and a record of the proceedings.58
Furthermore, the decision must be written by the "state or local govern-
ment or instrumentality" that made the decision.59
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis noting that the clear language
of the Act indicated that the "in writing" and "substantial evidence" lim-
itations were clearly separate from one another.60 It further held that the
district court had erred in compelling localities to include findings of fact
and explanations in their written decisions.61 The Fourth Circuit sup-
ported this holding by distinguishing the language of the Administrative
53 See id.
54 No. 98-2422, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 7493, at *7 (7th Cir. Apr. 19, 1999).
55 See id- at *16. The court also rejected the plaintiff-provider's argument that it had
been unreasonably discriminated against. See id.
56 This issue was not raised on appeal to the Second Circuit in Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town
of Oyster Bay or to the Seventh Circuit in Aegerton.
57 Western PCS 11, Corp. v. Extraterritorial Zoning Authority, 957 F. Supp. 1230, 1236
(post-appeal transcript); see also AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Winston-Salem, 11 F. Supp. 2d
760, 764 (one-word rubber stamp denial); Illinois RSA No. 3 v. County of Peoria, 963 F.
Supp. 732, 743 (post-appeal transcript).
58 See Primeco Personal Communications, L.P. v. Lake County, No. 97-208-civ-oc-10b,
1998 WL 565036, *8 (M.D. Fla. July 20, 1998); Winston-Salem, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 764; Cellco
Partnership v. Farmington, 3 F. Supp. 2d 178, 184 (D. Conn. 1998); Smart SMR v. Stratford,
995 F. Supp. 52, 55-57 (D. Conn. 1998); Illinois RSA No. 3, 963 F. Supp. at 743; Western PCS
II, 957 F. Supp. at 1236.
59 See Virginia Metronet, Inc. v. Bd. of Sup., 984 F. Supp. 966, 972 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(finding that denial written by member of county planning staff, but not the Board of Supervi-
sors, was inadequate).
60 See AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 429 (4h Cir. 1998).
61 See id.; see also Winston-Salem, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 764; Virginia Metronet, 984 F.
Supp. at 972; Illinois RSA No. 3, 963 F. Supp. at 743. In a subsequent case, the District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, in Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. City of Scran-
ton, No. 3:CV-97-0562, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1457 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1999), held that
whether the Fourth Circuit's interpretation or the Winston-Salem court's reading of this provi-
sion is correct, the in writing requirement in that case had been satisfied. The basis of the
court's holding was a letter sent to Omnipoint by the zoning board listing the reasons for the
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Procedure Act ("APA") and other sections of the Telecommunications
Act with the language actually contained in section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).62
The court noted that the APA expressly states that all decisions in adjudi-
cations or formal rulemaking "shall include statements of ... findings
and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor .... -63 Furthermore,
section 252(e)(1) of the Telecommunications Act requires "written find-
ings as to any deficiencies" of certain agreements and section 271(d)(3)
requires the FCC to "state the basis for its approval or denial" of certain
applications. 64 The court concluded, therefore, that Congress would
have required findings and explanations in section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) if it
wanted them, but that it had refrained from doing so in the context of
local decisions on wireless facility siting.65 Thus, a "decision . . . in
writing" necessarily encompasses the City Council's submission of the
minutes of its meetings and its affixing "DENIED" and the date of deci-
sion to the application. 66 The court also dismissed the idea that a broader
reading of the "in writing" requirement is necessary for judicial review,
so long as there is enough evidence in the record, finding instead, that the
substantial evidence requirement more than satisfies this need.67
B. SUPPORTED BY SUBsTANTIAL EVIDENCE
The term "substantial evidence" is found in cases68 and statutes69 on
administrative law. The Act's Conference Report provides little gui-
dance on its application in this context, stating simply that "the phrase
'substantial evidence contained in a written record' is the traditional stan-
dard for judicial review of agency action."'70 The substantial evidence
standard enunciated by the Supreme Court for review of federal agency
actions is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." 71
board's decision and the findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by the board's attor-
ney. See id. at *21 n.9.
62 See Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 429.
63 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)).
64 See id.
65 See id. (citing Keene Co. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993)) ("[W]here Con-
gress includes particular language in one § of a statute but omits it in another... it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.").
66 Id.
67 Id. at 430.
68 See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
69 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1998).
70 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458 (1996).
71 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Courts hearing cases brought under § 332(c)(7) have
adopted this standard. See, e.g., Cellular Tel. Co. v. Ho-Ho-Kus, 24 F. Supp. 2d 359, 365
(D.N.J. 1998).
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What that phrase actually means is not so clear in the context of an
Act that significantly preserves local authority and also creates federal
judicial review of a local quasi-legislative decision. Congressional adop-
tion of the federal standard in this context ignores the fact that local and
federal governments differ substantially, both in terms of demographic
and socioeconomic factors and in terms of how the relevant interest
groups "organize, their strength in the bargaining process, their ability to
demand political recognition, and the government settings in which they
operate .... "72 Some commentators argue that these factors combine to
make local governments more susceptible to freezing out certain interest
groups, which, they argue, compels broadening the scope of judicial in-
quiry.73 Adoption of the substantial evidence standard, rather than the
lesser "arbitrary and capricious" test, however, demonstrates that Con-
gress wanted some form of heightened scrutiny, but left the courts with
the task of deciding exactly what level of review is appropriate. 74
The Fourth Circuit posited that the "reasonable mind" is a legisla-
tor's, which affects the type of evidence that can be considered.75 The
court noted that the Virginia Beach City Council is a state legislative
body, not a federal administrative agency, and that the reasonable mind
of a bureaucrat necessarily differs from that of a legislator.76 It is, there-
fore, proper for constituent views to play a more significant role "in zon-
ing as in all other legislative matters. '77 This is consistent with the
court's overall more deferential reading of the Act's preservation of local
substantive control.
In Cellular Telephone Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 78 the Second
Circuit threw up its hands in disgust at the ambiguous provisions of the
72 Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 6, at 105.
73 See id. (discussing John Hart Ely's theory on judicial review and arguing that though
it has its detractors, Ely's "focus on political process failure... is especially relevant to local
governments ... ").
74 As part of a running debate on exactly this question, Mandelker and Tarlock admit
that, on a sub-constitutional level, this is an "almost intractable question." Mandelker &
Tarlock, supra note 6, at 107. They, however, argue that "heightened or hard-look judicial
review only works if there is a background standard" or theory as to the ideal land-use plan,
which of course does not exist. Id. at 108. Instead of heightened scrutiny, they argue that
there should no longer be a presumption of validity, but that the burden should be placed on
the locality to justify its decision. See id. at 107. In contrast, Robert Hopperton argues that a
presumption shift is a doctrinal dead end and fails to address the real issue. See Robert Hop-
perton, The Presumption of Validity in American Land-Use Law: A Substitute for Analysis, A
Source of Significant Confusion, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. RaV. 301 (1996).
75 See AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 1998).
76 See id.
77 Id. The court went to hold that while the plaintiff's application may amount to a
preponderance of evidence in favor of approval, the "repeated and widespread opposition of a
majority of the citizens of Virginia Beach... amounts to far more than a 'mere scintilla' of
evidence to persuade a reasonable mind to oppose the application." Id. at 431.
78 166 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Act and held that, regardless of which standard applied, it had not been
satisfied in this case.79 The court acknowledged that, while federal
courts have historically given "extremely deferential" review to local
zoning decisions80 and Congress "explicitly preserved local zoning au-
thority," the express provision for judicial review required the court to
look "more closely [at denials subject to the Act] than at standard local
zoning decisions."81 The court explained that the substantial evidence
test is, nonetheless, a deferential standard82 and that "local and state zon-
ing laws govern the weight to be given the evidence." 83
In wending its way through this thicket of poorly-defined standards,
the court first found that because cellular telephone companies are public
utilities in New York, applications for variances are judged by a different
standard than that ordinarily applied in reviewing a zoning decision.84
The court also noted that under New York law, aesthetics is a valid
ground upon which a locality may base its decision. 85 Applying a
"closer look/public utility" analysis, the court held that the unsubstanti-
ated concerns voiced by only some citizens at the public hearings, re-
garding aesthetic and property value issues, were inadequate to support a
finding of substantial evidence underlying the Board's decision.8 6 The
79 See id. at 497.
80 Daniel R. Mandelker and A. Dan Tarlock, explain that:
zoning was originally justified as the application of scientific policy for the better-
ment of the community, and proponents counseled judicial deference to local gov-
ernments. This deference was supported both by the Jeffersonian faith in local
institutions and the progressive vision that planning experts could control the ex-
cesses of popular democracy.
Supra note 6, at 111.
81 Cellular TeL Co., 166 F.3d at 493.
82 See id. at 494.
83 Id.
84 See id. (citing Cellular Tel. Co. v. Rosenberg, 82 N.Y.2d 364, 371, 604 N.Y.S.2d 895,
624 N.E.2d 990 (1993)). Public utilities must show "a need for its facilities and whether the
needs of the broader public would be served by granting the variance," rather than the general
"unnecessary hardship" standard. Id. (citing Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 43
N.Y.2d 483, 490 (1977)). The court fails to mention that this standard is interpreted as not
granting carte blanche authority to a utility or as giving a utility the power to "place a facility
wherever it chooses within the community." Matter of Consolidated Edison v. Hoffman, 43
N.Y.2d 598, 610 (1979), cited in Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 996 F. Supp. 253, 257
(W.D.N.Y. 1998) (affirming zoning board's rejection of Sprint's petition).
85 See id. (citing Suffolk Outdoor Advertising, 43 N.Y.2d at 490).
86 See id. at 495-96; Omnipoint Corp. v. Pine Grove, 20 F. Supp. 2d 875 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(holding that citizen protestors had failed to establish their objections with a sufficiently high
degree of probability); Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Town of North Stonington, 12 F. Supp. 2d
247, 253 (D. Conn. 1998) (citing Connecticut court decisions for the premise that "conclusion
by laypersons as to the effect from the granting of [a] special use permit, without supporting
evidence or facts, is insufficient to support the denial of the special use permit."); see also
Iowa Wireless Services, L.P. v. City of Moline, No. 98-4090, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19542
(C.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 1998) (holding that citizens' concerns were too generalized to be substan-
tial); BellSouth Mobility v. Gwinnett County, 944 F. Supp. 923, 928 (followed in Omnipoint).
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Second Circuit acknowledged the existence of disagreement among the
courts on the weight to be accorded citizen views, but concluded that the
evidence before the court was not substantial under any of the competing
standards.87
In contrast to the ambiguity cited by the Second Circuit panel and
the more deferential quasi-legislative standard adopted by the Fourth Cir-
cuit, the Seventh Circuit in Aegerter v. City of Delafields held that there
was no reason to unnecessarily complicate the statute by "attempting to
subdivide any of these categories [of judicial review] even further."89
The court noted that the locality had relied on a pre-existing plan ad-
dressing tower siting, the aesthetics of the proposed tower, and its impact
on property values in the area. 90 The court reasoned that, ultimately,
Congress had envisioned that localities would make decisions like this
and that safeguards included in section 332(c)(7) protect the federal in-
terests at stake.91 The court also addressed the Fourth Circuit's distinc-
tion between the reasonable mind of a legislator versus that of a
bureaucrat, which compelled that court to adopt a more deferential appli-
cation of the substantial evidence standard.92 The court was skeptical
whether judges can actually "apply more than a few standards of re-
view."93 The court also noted that local boards "often wear several hats
when they act," so characterizing them as legislators is a misnomer.94
Instead, they are more akin to an administrative agency, and therefore the
court should just apply the "conventional substantial evidence stan-
dard."95 The court's statement provides little guidance because it begs
the question of what the conventional test is, which, as some commenta-
tors argue, varies depending on the context.96
In a case arising in the time between the above-mentioned Second
and Fourth Circuit Court cases, the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia, in SprintCom, Inc. v. City of Cumming,97 held that the
city's denial was not supported by substantial evidence. This case is an
example of the other end of the spectrum from the Fourth Circuit in ap-
87 See Cellular Tel. Co., 166 F.3d at 495 (comparing Omnipoint Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d at
880, with Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 430). No. 98-2422, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS (71 Cir.
April 19, 1999).
88 No. 98-2422, 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS (7d' Cir. April 19, 1999).
89 Id. at *7.
90 See id. at *10.
91 See id. at *10-11.
92 See id. at *7.
93 Id. at *8.
94 Id.
95 Id. (noting that "[w]hen they are passing ordinances or other laws, they are without a
doubt legislators, but when they sit as an administrative body making decisions about zoning
permits, they are like any other agency the state has created.").
96 See STaRluss, infra note 99.
97 No. 2:98-CV-95-WCO, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18523 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 1998).
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plying the substantial evidence test. The court not only rewrote the
City's zoning ordinance,98 but also rejected additional evidence properly
considered by the zoning board by reading the Act's procedural limita-
tions into proceedings preliminary to the Board's actual decision.99 This
seems to go further than even the closer look analysis advocated by the
Second Circuit. In contrast, the District Court for the Western District of
Michigan, in Century Cellunet of Southern Michigan, Inc. v. City of Fer-
rysburg, took a more deferential approach.'0o The court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendant upon finding that (1) the City's
decision that the provider failed to document its assertions regarding the
unreasonable risk of the tower failing was supported by substantial evi-
dence, and (2) the City's finding that the City was so small that such a
tall tower would necessarily fail to be in harmony with the existing area
was supported by substantial evidence.' 0 '
"Although [the substantial evidence] standard is understood as be-
ing 'highly deferential,' it has been applied with varying degrees of def-
erence in different contexts."'. 2 Judicial review of zoning decisions is
filled with pitfalls for the unwary, including inquiry into legislative mo-
tives and "the lack of clear entitlements to any given outcome."'10 3 Fur-
thermore, the concerns regarding the extent and appropriateness of
judicial review are heightened when applied on a sub-constitutional basis
98 See id. at *13. The City zoning ordinance excepted noncommercial towers from
height limitations, but the court held that, because the City could "make no justifiable distinc-
tion between commercial towers such as the one planned by SprintCom and noncommercial
towers as those exempt from the height restriction," denial on these grounds was insubstantial.
Id.
99 See id. The court held that because citizen objections and recommendations of denial
from the Planning and Zoning Commigsion, upon which the Board based its decision, did not
state the reasons for their position, denial on these grounds was insubstantial. See id.
100 993 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
101 See id. at 1077.
102 PE= L. STRAuss Er AL., G .auO.N AND Bys.'s ADmNISTRATIVE LAW 529 (9th ed.
1995) (citing Sidney Shapiro & Richard Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Sub-
stantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DuKE L.J. 1051, 1065 (1995), who attribute
the shifting nature of the standard to outcome-oriented judicial incentives). But see Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44 DUKE L. 1110
(1995). Pierce argues that the standard "is well understood, and the results of its application
are easy to predict in the vast majority of cases," as well as it "being unusually durable and
relatively impervious to manipulation." Id. at 1114. Interestingly, Pierce acknowledges that
the substantial evidence test has been distorted when dealing with "unusually politically
charged contexts," such as the labor battles of the 1950s and the Social Security Administra-
tion disability decisions of the 1980s. Id. at 1115. The federalism concerns and battles for
local control that are the subtext of the fight over tower siting are hardly any less virulent. It
should not, therefore, be surprising to see the courts struggling with the substantial evidence
test in this context.
103 Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 6, at 111 (arguing that naked heightened judicial
review, without a change in the burden, "directly exposes courts to these traps").
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across sovereign lines.1°4 The local decisions in these cases are highly
politicized affairs that involve a multitude of interests; ranging from the
providers who have spent millions of dollars to acquire licensing rights,
to neighbors living near the proposed tower site, to cell phone users both
living in the area and those just passing through, to advocates for devel-
opment. The charged nature of these decisions may be precisely the rea-
son why Congress probably provided for judicial review. Nonetheless,
the local nature and immediacy of the decision, as distinguished from a
federal or even state administrative decision, should compel courts to
undertake a truly deferential reading of the substantial evidence standard.
Although Congress expressly provided a federal overlay on local zoning
decisions regarding the siting of telecommunications facilities, the sepa-
ration of powers concerns that run throughout federal administrative law
are of equal concern in this context. 05 It is these concerns that the courts
should implicitly consider when reading the substantial evidence
requirement.
The choice is ultimately about allocating power and "power exer-
cised by someone other than its designated possessor is power
abused."' 06 Zoning boards are personifications of the distinction be-
tween politics and the law that Justice Holmes noted almost eighty-five
years ago, that in a complex society people are protected "by their power,
immediate or remote, over those who make the rule .... -1o7 The intel-
lectual underpinnings of the doctrine of separation of powers nonetheless
recognizes that, while "dependence on the people is, no doubt, the pri-
mary control on the government," experience has taught that precautions
must be taken to prevent tyranny, promote the rule of law, and control
against arbitrary government.'08 The Act could, therefore, be read as
equalizing the immediate power of the local citizens who may capture
1o4 See Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls Over
Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. Rnv. 1251 (1992) ("[J]udges
should recognize the potential workability of political controls over administrative action when
interpreting statutes that structure the resolution of essentially political disputes.").
105 See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency In-
terpretations of Agency Rules, 96 CoLuM. L. REv. 612, 617 (1996). The Court's decision in
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), reflects the
constitutional preference for decision making by politically accountable agencies rather than
the more insulated judiciary. See id. at 865-66. After all, the Framers considered the account-
ability of the legislature as a major safeguard of liberty under the Constitution. See Manning,
supra, at 634 n.1 19 (citing GoRoN S. WOOD, Tim CREAoN OF THE AMERICAN REPuauc,
1776-1787, 543 (1969)).
106 Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Adminis-
trative State, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 452, 466 (1989). This is not to say that judicial review is
anathema to the proper allocation of zoning authority. After all, "representative democracy, if
unaccompanied by an effective separation of power, insufficiently protect[s] liberty." Man-
ning, supra note 105, at 640.
107 Bi-Metallie Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
108 Manning, supra note 105, at 640, 646.
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control of the zoning board and the telecommunications provider who is
generally considered the interloper. 0 9 Judicial review has long been
seen as a means of empowering underrepresented or outside groups
whose voices would not otherwise be heard.110 While claims of inequity
by the provider community may be true to an extent, the Act's proce-
dural limitations may actually be an example of provider capture of Con-
gress."' The Act imposes standards not previously found in local
decision making. 112 Further, the requirement of expeditious review of
applications gives a distinct advantage to the providers who have the
experience, research and money necessary to pursue their goals in the
new, highly competitive world of personal wireless communications.
The telecommunications providers are a strong and active constituency
that needs little protection. Annual revenues in the industry exceed $750
billion per year, 113 with more than $27 billion attributable to the cellular
industry alone, 1 4 and there is tremendous pressure for further expansion.
The wireless industry anticipates further penetration of U.S. households
even beyond the fifty million people who are already users. 115 The com-
bination of a less-deferential review with the judiciary's inclination to
generously grant mandamus or injunctions 16 is inconsistent with the ex-
press preservation of local control provided by Congress. While zoning
boards, like judges, are generally not elected entities, they differ from the
judiciary in that they are answerable to the political branches. Therefore,
if the judiciary substitutes its judgment for that of local officials, who are
arguably better "positioned to determine how to effectuate the needs and
109 See Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitution-
ality in Land-Use Law, 24 U"a. L. 1, 36 (1992). Mandelker and Tarlock note that while
interest groups may sometimes capture the process it is important to distinguish this from the
fluid pluralist political process in which coalitions rightfully may form and dissolve. Id.
110 See Strauss, supra note 104, at 1259 (discussing John Hart Ely's Democracy and Dis-
trust (1980), and Judge Warren Burger's comment in United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
111 Some have likened the background and enactment of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 to the era of federal giveaways to the railroads in the 19th Century, which was "the last
time a newly-subdued continent was parceled out to Robber Barons." Eben Moglen, The In-
visible Barbecue, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 945, 946 & n.l (1997).
112 See Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 1999).
113 See Hughes, supra note 3, at 472.
114 See U.S. Wireless Subscribership Rose by More than 11 Million in 1997 CTIA Survey
Says, PCS WEE, Apr. 8, 1998.
115 See Hughes, supra note 3; see also U.S. Wireless Subscribership Rose by More than
11 Million in 1997 CTIA Survey Says, PCS WEEK, Apr. 8, 1998.
116 See infra Part I.
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concerns of their citizens," 117 even this "secondary link to the electorate
is lost."" 8
I. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY?
The Act permits plaintiff-providers to appeal facility siting deci-
sions by local zoning boards in federal district court, but the Act and its
legislative history are silent as to the proper remedy." 9 In nearly all the
cases decided to date, if the provider establishes a violation of one of the
provisions of section 332(c)(7), the court has granted a writ of mandamus
to compel the locality to approve the permit or use variance sought. 120
This is despite the fact that courts have historically been hesitant to en-
croach upon the quasi-legislative prerogatives of local zoning boards.121
In light of the explicit rejection of federal preemption and the additional
significant federalism issues involved in the federal review of local zon-
ing decisions, this practice raises significant concerns that the courts'
willingness to issue a writ is a misreading of the Act and contrary to
Congressional intent. Professor Manning argues that "if a court must
assign meaning to an... agency-regulating statute in the face of legisla-
tive indeterminacy, it should presume, absent a clear indication to the
contrary, that the statute opts for arrangements that best conform to the
basic structural commitments of our constitutional scheme.' 22 Under
the circumstances, federal judges directing the actions of local zoning
boards flies in the face of this sensible default rule.
Under the Act, Congress certainly intended to grant the reviewing
federal courts jurisdiction to somehow issue binding remedies as part and
parcel of their authority to review. Otherwise, their decisions would
merely be advisory in nature and unconstitutional. At a minimum, there-
fore, federal courts reviewing violations of the Act's procedural limita-
tions can be assumed to have the power to vacate and/or remand a cause
of action upon reviewing a local decision. Sometimes, however, this is
clearly insufficient to protect the rights of a provider under the Act. For
instance, if a zoning board improperly refuses to issue the variance
117 Palermo, supra note 2, at 258.
118 Farina, supra note 106, at 466 (discussing the underlying premises of the Supreme
Court's analysis in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
119 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (1998). Strikingly, this should be compared with the
FCC's enabling statute, which specifies the substantive standard for judicial review of actions
brought under § 402, stating that a Court of Appeals may "make and enter ... a judgment
determining the validity of, and enjoining, setting aside, or suspending, in whole or in part, the
order of the agency." 28 U.S.C. § 2349(a) (1998).
120 See infra notes 112-127 and accompanying text.
121 See KNNm YouNG, ANDERSON'S AMERIcAN LAW OF ZONING § 27.39 (4th ed.
1996).
122 Manning, supra note 105, at 637.
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sought, Congress presumably envisioned that the provider would receive
some kind of affirmative relief from the federal courts. In less clear cut
cases, the remaining questions are: (1) what is the appropriate affirmative
remedy that is most consistent with Congressional intent underlying sec-
tion 332(c)(7), and (2) when should that remedy be applied.
The above assumes that plaintiff-providers pursue affirmative relief
directly under the Act. An alternative, discussed only briefly here, is to
seek such relief under section 1983.123 The Supreme Court has held that
section 1983 is sometimes available to enforce violations of federal stat-
utes.124 While providers have already begun adding section 1983 claims
to their filings, relief has been limited to attorney's fees, and any equita-
ble relief granted is attributed to section 332(c)(7).125 In addition, the
Court's doctrine in this area is so complicated that it is unclear whether
plaintiffs adopting such an argument would be successful.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that allows a court to compel
another branch of government to act in a particular way. In light of the
extraordinary nature of mandamus, the significant federalism concerns
inherent in the nature of the judicial review provided by the Act, and
Congress' failure to provide a clear statement of the proper remedy,
courts must look elsewhere for guidance. One source of congressional
and judicial experience can be found in the cases arising under section
706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).126 At a minimum,
when determining the type and scope of remedy to provide, the courts
should contemplate the impact of those well-informed views. This note
will first detail the current mandamus practice as it has been developed
123 See Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1998).
124 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). "[I]n order to seek redress through
§ 1983 .... a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of
federal law." Blessing v. Firestone, 520 U.S. 329, 339-40 (1997). The Court has developed a
three-part test to determine whether a particular statutory provision rises to the level of a
federal right. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
While courts construing § 332(c)(7) have agreed that it creates a federal right, there is disa-
greement over whether the Act impliedly forecloses private enforcement as a "comprehensive
enforcement scheme," as described in Blessing. 520 U.S. at 341-42; compare National Tele-
communications Advisors, Inc. v. City of Chicopee, 16 F. Supp. 2d 117, 122 (D. Mass, 1998)
("a § 1983 action is not available to obtain a remedy for violation of the TCA... ") with
Omnipoint Communications Enter., L.P. v. Chadds Ford Township, No. 98-3299, 1998 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 17403, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1998) (distinguishing National Telecommunica-
tions Advisors and noting that the Supreme Court has only twice found a remedial scheme
sufficiently comprehensive to preclude a § 1983 claim); APT Minneapolis, Inc. v. City of
Maplewood, No. 97-2082, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14613, at *21 (D. Minn. Aug.12, 1998) (col-
lecting other consistent cases).
125 See Omnipoint Communications Enter., 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17403, at *26; APT
Minneapolis, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14613, at *20; National Telecommunication Advisors, 16
F. Supp. 2d 117; Cellco Partnership v. Farmington, 3 F. Supp. 2d 178, 186 (D. Conn. 1998);
Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Town of Easton, 982 F. Supp. 47, 53 (D. Mass. 1997).
126 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1998).
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by courts under section 332(c)(7) and then discuss how and why the
courts should look to the APA for guidance.
A. CURRENT MANDAMUS PRACrICE UNDER THE Acr
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. 127 Traditionally, the power
of the courts to grant such relief was predicated on a distinction between
ministerial and discretionary duties. 128 As the doctrine has developed,
however, the dispute centers around the scope of the delegated power,
determined by asking whether the defendant's actions were consistent
with the Act and the underlying congressional purpose.129 Inverting its
traditional status as an exceptional remedy available only in unusual cir-
cumstances, courts construing section 332(c)(7) have elevated mandamus
to the standard remedy whenever the defendant-zoning board fails to
meet any of the procedural burdens of the Act. For example, despite
satisfying all of the other requirements of the Act, the district court in
Cellco Partnership v. Town of Farmington, granted the plaintiff's request
for equitable relief based solely on the board failing to formally request
certain information from Cellco and not adequately explaining its deci-
127 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Dist. Court for the Northern Dist. of California, 339
U.S. 844 (1950); Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41 (1969). For example, in the context of
writs compelling a lower court to act, the Supreme Court has recognized that:
[o]nly exceptional circumstances, amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, will
justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy. The reasons for this Court's
chary authorization of mandamus as an extraordinary remedy have often been ex-
plained.... A judicial readiness to issue the writ of mandamus in anything less than
an extraordinary situation would "run the real risk of defeating the very policies
sought to be furthered by that judgment of Congress." In order to insure that the writ
will issue only in extraordinary circumstances, this Court has required that a party
seeking issuance have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires, and
that he satisfy the "burden of showing that [his] right to issuance of the writ is 'clear
and indisputable."' In short, our cases have answered the question as to the availabil-
ity of mandamus in situations such as this with the refrain: "What never? Well,
hardly ever!"
Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35-36 (1980) (citations omitted).
128 The Supreme Court explains that:
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty, this being its chief use. It is also employed to compel action, when refused, in
matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way, nor to direct the retraction or reversal of action already
taken in the exercise of either.
Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206, 218 (1930), cited in Mandamus in Administrative Ac-
tions: Current Approaches, 1973 DuKE L.J. 207, 207 (1973). For a history of the use of
mandamus, see Note, Mandatory Injunctions as Substitutes for Writs of Mandamus in the
Federal District Courts: A Study in Procedural Manipulation, 38 CoLuM. L. REv. 903 (1938).
129 See Clark Byse & Joseph V. Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of
1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARv. L. Rav.
308, 333 (1967).
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sion.' 30 This is not only an improper application of traditional manda-
mus practice in local zoning decisions, but its hair-trigger application
undermines the intent of the Act by effectively preempting local zoning
authority over wireless facility siting.' 31 In fact, Congress expressly
stated that providers should not expect preferential treatment. 132
Three early decisions on the issue are consistently cited by later
courts as authority for when mandamus is appropriate for violations of
section 332(c)(7).133 In all three cases, the courts held that because the
Act requires that district courts "shall hear and decide such action on an
expedited basis"' 34 and considering the conference report's exhortation
to the courts to "act expeditiously in deciding such cases,"'135 mandamus
is the appropriate relief when the record supports approval of the pro-
vider's application.' 36 Conversely, remand is considered inappropriate
because it necessarily results in additional delays.' 37 Interestingly, the
first court to speak to this issue, the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia, in Bell South Mobility, merely cited a 1988 Supreme
Court of Georgia decision in support of its holding. 138 In that case, the
district court held that since the zoning board's denial was an act of dis-
cretion lacking articulable, objective grounds for support, the plaintiff
had a clear right to issuance of the permit and writ of mandamus from the
court. 139 Subsequent courts have not examined the underlying premises
130 3 F. Supp. 2d 178, 182-84. The court's decision is not even tied to the BellSouth
Mobility standard, in which plaintiffs must nonetheless demonstrate a clear legal right to the
variance in order for equitable relief to be granted. See infra notes 125-130 and accompanying
text.
131 See supra Part I.
132 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-455, 104th Cong., at 208 (1996).
133 See Western PCS II, Corp. v. Extraterritorial Zoning Authority, 957 F. Supp. 1230
(D.N.M. 1997); Illinois RSA, No. 3 v. Peoria, 963 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Ill. 1997); BellSouth
Mobility v. Gwinnett County, 944 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Ga. 1996). Ignored by subsequent
courts is that the court in Illinois RSA, No. 3, actually issued an injunction, see 963 F. Supp. at
747, rather than a writ.
134 Illinois RSA, No.3, 963 F. Supp. at 747; Western PCS I1, 957 F. Supp. at 25; BellSouth
Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 929.
135 supra note 121, at § 27.39.
136 See id.
137 See, e.g., Illinois RSA, No. 3, 963 F. Supp. at 747 ('The County had its chance to
produce substantial evidence to support its position, and it did not do so. No reason exists to
send this case back to that body."); Virginia Metronet, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 984 F. Supp.
966, 977 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("Remand would simply further delay the resolution of this issue.").
138 See Bell South Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 928 (citing Fulton County v. Bartenfeld, 363
S.E.2d 555 (1988), which held that because the applicant "complied with all objective condi-
tions," had a "clear legal right to issuance of the permit," and since the board's denial lacked
any "objective ground of support," a writ of mandamus ordering approval of the application
was appropriate).
139 See id. at 771.
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of the district court's decision'4°-whether Georgia mandamus practice
differs from other states' laws"a"-and they have interpreted the holding
to permit mandamus only based on a finding that the board's decision
lacks support of substantial evidence or even merely that the plaintiff has
won on the merits. 142 Neither of these interpretations is actually consis-
tent with the BellSouth Mobility mandamus analysis, which limited the
grant of mandamus to instances where the plaintiff has a clear legal right
to the permit or variance sought. 143
To date, there are only three cases that have challenged these as-
sumptions and held that mandamus is not the appropriate remedy for
violations of section 332(c)(7). In AT&T Wireless Services v. Orange
County, Judge Baker concluded that not only had there been no finding
by any local authority that AT&T's application complied with code re-
quiemetsbut also that the retention of local authority cotmpaedi
the Act would be thwarted by issuing a writ of mandamus.'" Judge
Castillo, in Primeco Personal Communications, L.P. v. Village of Fox
Lake, though not citing Judge Baker's earlier holding, came to a similar
conclusion in denying mandamus and rejecting Primeco's assumption
that it was entitled to mandamus relief merely because it had prevailed
on the merits. 145 Judge Castillo also noted that there is a presumption
against mandamus because of the unsettled nature of the law in this area
and, therefore, remand was appropriate. 146 In a subsequent decision in
the same case, Judge Castillo reiterated that the zoning board was dealing
with "a new law startling in its departure from traditional notions of local
140 But see SprintCom, Inc. v, City of Cumming, No. 2:98-CV-95-WCO, 1998 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 18523, at *18 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 1998) (finding mandamus relief appropriate). The
court held that neither BellSouth nor AT&T Wireless Services v. Orange County, see discus-
sion supra note 107 and accompanying text, were on point because although no local authority
had at any time approved plaintiff's application, the denials were made without explanation.
141 See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law, 48 MEncEm L. Rnv. 421,436 n.126
(1996) (suggesting overuse of mandamus practice in Georgia). For additional analysis of the
overuse of mandamus practice in Georgia, see R. PERRY SE14ru.L, JR., Miscasting Mandamus
in Georgia Local Government Law (1988).
142 See, e.g., AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Winston-Salem, 11 F. Supp. 2d 760 (M.D.N.C.
1998) (granting mandamus because zoning board violated the Act); APT Minneapolis, Inc. v.
City of Maplewood, No. 97-2082, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14613 (D. Minn. Aug. 12, 1998)
(granting mandamus because board's decision not supported by substantial evidence); Virginia
Metronet, 984 F. Supp. 966 (holding that mandamus is the appropriate remedy because de-
fendant could have, but did not, provide substantial evidence in the record). Sara Evans argues
that these early cases establish a solid justification and analysis for granting a writ of manda-
mus. See Sara A. Evans, Note, Wireless Service Providers v. Zoning Commissions: Preserva-
tion of State and Local Zoning Authority Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 32 GA.
L. Rav. 965, 1000-02 (1998).
143 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
144 982 F. Supp. at 861.
145 26 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (granting summary judgment for plaintiff
on defendant's failure to provide a written decision supported by substantial evidence).
146 See id.
412 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 8:389
authority over zoning decisions," as well as a lack of experience "with
federal agency procedures" and inconsistent guidance from the courts. 147
In light of the strict time limit the court had placed on the board to re-
evaluate Primeco's petition on remand and expedited hearing by the dis-
trict court, remand is the appropriate remedy because it "incorporate[s]
Congress' concerns regarding timeliness.' 48
In Omnipoint Corp. v. Pine Grove, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment for the plaintiff-pro-
vider, finding that generalized citizen concerns were insubstantial.' 49
However, in considering the appropriate remedy the court converted
plaintiff's request for a writ into an injunction, citing Rule 81(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which abolishes the writ of manda-
mus. 150 This decision was the first to recognize that while state courts
may have unlimited mandamus power, the power of the federal courts to
issue writs has been proscribed. 151 None of the other courts to have con-
sidered the appropriate relief for violations of section 332(c)(7) have
considered the limits on mandamus jurisdiction. This failure begs the
question of how, absent clear and unambiguous direction from Congress,
147 Primeco Personal Communications, L.P. v. Village of Fox Lake, No. 97-C-8023, 1999
U.S. Dist. Lexis 3309, at *4 (N.D. III. March 12, 1999).
148 Id. at *6.
149 20 F. Supp. 2d 875 (1998) (noting the speculative nature of the concerns voiced and
that Pennsylvania law does not permit economic or aesthetic considerations as a basis for
denial).
150 See id. Similarly, in other cases, conversion of a petition, rather than dismissal of the
case, is permitted to avoid an otherwise harsh result. See Heine v. Arkansas State University,
972 F. Supp. 1175, 1181 (1997) (citing Olson v. Hart, 965 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1992) and
holding that it may construe plaintiff's pleading as requesting injunctive and declaratory re-
lief). The willingness of the courts to construe requests for mandamus as such flows from the
rejection of formalistic pleading rules and the merger of law and equity. See Stem v. South
Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606 (1968) (holding that the relief sought was not mandamus but
was equitable relief, and that, therefore, the district court had jurisdiction to grant relief under
its traditional equity power).
151 Notwithstanding Rule 81(b), Congress has preserved some power in the courts. For
example, the Federal Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 provides that "district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff."
28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1998) (emphasis added). The Mandamus and Venue Act on its face is
inapplicable to a local zoning board, which is neither an officer/employee of the United States
nor is it a federal agency. Similarly, the All Writs Act only preserves the courts' ability to
"issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to
the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 165 1(a) (1998); see also 32 AM Jtm. 2D § 408
(discussing interaction between mandamus practice, the All Writs Act and FRCP 81(b)). Fed-
eral courts, therefore, have "no general jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus where that is
the only relief sought." 32 AM JuR. 2D § 408 (1998) (citing Shelton v. Randolph, 373 F. Supp.
448 (W.D. Va. 1974); Haggard v. Tennessee, 421 F.2d 1384 (6th Cir. 1970)). Even assuming
that § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) places federal courts in a proper supervisory role so as to theoretically
bring the jurisdictional enforcement mechanism of the All Writs Act into play, § 1361 limits
the use of such orders to federal officers and agencies. See Harris v. Dep't of Corrections, 426
F. Supp. 350 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
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the courts have managed to assume such power.152 Ultimately, however,
the distinction may be irrelevant because the difference between manda-
mus and an affirmative injunction is academic, 153 and the remedies are
interchangeable.' 54
Notwithstanding these problems, the line of cases following Bell-
South Mobility reflect a misreading of the Act. First, the Act does not
contemplate preemption of local zoning authority over wireless facility
siting decisions, 155 which is effectively what granting mandamus on such
broad grounds provides.' 56 Second, the language cited by the courts only
compels expedited review, but not necessarily a final decision, especially
when read in the context of clear legislative intent to preserve local zon-
ing authority. The Act does permit district courts to "hear and decide
such action[s] on an expedited basis,"'157 which is reiterated in the Act's
legislative history.' 58 It does not, however, direct courts to necessarily
grant final relief.159 Contrary to the courts' assertions, remand neither
frustrates the intent of the Act nor compels issuance of a writ.' 60 Re-
mand is, in fact, consistent with the Act's preservation of local authority.
If the delay is arguably one of ameliorating permissible local concerns-
e.g. aesthetics and property values and not RF-related health issues 161-
granting an order in the nature of mandamus to direct the exercise of
discretion left to the zoning board is inappropriate and unduly inflates the
judiciary's statutory role in such decisions.' 62 Furthermore, in state land
use practice, remand is even appropriate "where a board denied relief on
ultra vires grounds [or] . . . applied an erroneous standard .. "163 A
decision by the zoning board using its discretionary powers is, therefore,
the preferred means of resolving the issue. By providing additional pro-
cedural protections to providers making their way through the zoning
approval process, Congress affirmatively sustained local substantive
152 Contrast § 332(c)(7)'s silence with § 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act. See
discussion infra note 156-176..
153 See Fulton County v. Bartenfield, 363 S.E.2d 555 (1998) (upholding a writ of manda-
mus ordering approval of an permit application).
154 See Note, supra note 128, at 908.
155 See supra notes 19-40 and accompanying text.
156 See supra Part I.
157 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (1998).
158 See H.R. CoNF. Rap. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996).
159 Cf. BellSouth Mobility, 944 F. Supp. at 929 (holding that the Act's intent is "to pro-
vide aggrieved parties full relief on an expedited basis").
160 See AT&T Wireless Services v. Orange County, 982 F. Supp. 856, 861 (M.D. Fla.
1997) (distinguishing cases and holding that remand is appropriate remedy).
161 Local regulation on the basis of RF environmental effects is preempted by 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).
162 See Carol R. Miaskoff, Note, Judicial Review of Agency Delay and Inaction Under
Section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 635, 643 (1987).
163 YouNr, supra note 121, § 27.39.
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law. 1' This policy decision is, however, vetoed when the courts are so
willing to order zoning boards to take particular action. Of course, a
zoning board that entirely flouts the Act's procedural limitations and
threatens to never approve an application for a wireless facility invites
extraordinary judicial intervention by grant of affirmative equitable re-
lief.165 What is most important to consider in these cases is whether the
local board is shown to owe plaintiff a clear, plainly defined (rather than
merely discretional) duty to issue the permit or variance, and that there is
no alternative adequate remedy available.1 66 Due to the need to show a
clear legal duty and the hesitancy to override discretionary authority, the
availability of mandamus, or even injunctive relief, should necessarily
vary according to the extent to which each locality delegates discretion-
ary authority to its zoning boards. However, this consideration is not
found in any of the decisions rendered so far. Because of the cross-
sovereign relationship between the federal court system and a local zon-
ing board, courts should hesitate to order approval of a variance even
when the plaintiff has demonstrated that it has met all of the require-
ments. At the very least, reviewing courts should expressly analyze
these issues rather than render the off-the-cuff orders issued to date. 167
B. ADMiNiSTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT
Although the APA is, by definition, not applicable, 68 it can serve
by analogy as a valuable guidepost in maintaining the delicate balance
between federal procedural requirements and local substantive law.' 69
The APA is a good example of Congress acknowledging the federalism
concerns inherent in judicial review of agency decisions, which concerns
were expressly (though not entirely unambiguously) addressed in the
Act's remedial provisions. Section 706 provides that a reviewing court
164 See Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1999) (find-
ing that "the TCA does not 'affect or encroach upon the substantive standards to be applied
under established principles of state and local law."').
165 See YOUNG, supra note 121, § 28.05; see also Western PCS II v. Extraterritorial Zon-
ing Authority, 957 F. Supp. 1230, 1239 (D.N.M. 1997) ("The Court is concerned that should it
simply remand this matter to the EZA it will simply find alternative 'reasons' for a denial,
rather than basing its decision on the record before it."). In Western PCS II, the court found
that the zoning board's decision had the effect of prohibiting wireless services, nor was it in
writing or supported by "any indicia" of substantial evidence. See 957 F. Supp. at 1236-38.
166 See 13 A.L.R. FED. 145 (1998) (collecting cases).
167 See, e.g., Cellular Tel. Co., 166 F.3d at 497 (holding that, although the Act does not
specify a remedy, trial court's mandamus is affirmed "[g]iven the weight of authority").
168 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1998) (defining the term "agency" within the APA, as "each
authority of the Government of the United States .... and, therefore, not inclusive of a local
zoning board).
169 "The Act... settles long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula
upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest .. " Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950).
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shall "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be... unsupported by substantial evidence .... -170
The APA thus considers orders compelling action and remand to be ap-
propriate remedies under certain circumstances. 171 The relationship of
mandamus and the APA is closely analogous. In adopting the APA's
standards, Congress sanctioned the historical practice of issuing writs of
mandamus or injunctions to compel agency action.172 However, even
from the beginning, Congress was concerned about authorizing "judicial
interference in the administrative process by directing agencies to reach
specific results," because of the detrimental impact this could have on the
separation of powers.173 The APA's ambiguous reference to "com-
pel[ling] agency action," is grounded in a court's power to grant writs of
mandamus and injunctive relief under section 706, which is predicated
on the Federal Mandamus and Venue Act and the All Writs Act. 174 As
previously discussed, these Acts would not reach federal court review of
a local zoning decision even if the APA did apply. 175
District courts reviewing claims under section 332(c)(7) should,
nonetheless, find the cases decided under section 706 instructive in ana-
lyzing the issue of unreasonable delay and in allaying concerns over frus-
trating the overarching intent of the Telecommunications Act.176 For
example, in Health Systems Agency v. Norman, the Tenth Circuit held
that the agency was not in compliance with the statutory program. 177
The court found that this lack of compliance amounted to "agency action
unlawfully withheld" and used its power under section 706(1) to facili-
tate implementation of the statutory scheme. 178 Most importantly, the
170 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), (2)(E).
171 See Miaskoff, supra note 162, at 637 n.9. Miaskoff argues that, unlike the potential
harm to the doctrine of separation of powers posed by § 706(1)'s authority to compel action,
the power to set aside under paragraph (2) represents far less of a threat. See id.
172 See Miaskoff, supra note 162, at 635. The United States Department of Justice, Attor-
ney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947), states that § 706(1) "ap-
pears to be a particularized restatement of mandamus practice." Id. at 108, cited in Miaskoff,
supra note 162, at 637 n.17.
173 See Miaskoff, supra note 162, at 637; see id. at 639 n.37 (citing Carpet, Linoleum &
Resilient Tile Layers, Local 419 v. Brown, 656 F.2d 564, 566 (10th Cir. 1981)).
174 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1651(a) (1998).
175 See discussion supra note 127-132.
176 See, e.g., Petersburg Cellular Partnership v. Nottoway County, No. 3:98cv503, 1998
U.S. Dist. Lexis 19720 (E.D. Va. Dec. 14, 1998).
177 589 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1978).
178 Id. The court held that the agency had abused its discretion in waiving the plaintiff's
late application for designation as a Health Systems Agency under the National Health Plan-
ning and Resources Development Act. See id. at 488. The court found that the agency's
actions were "flatly contrary" to its policies, for which it had failed to provide any justifica-
tion, and that the agency had failed to consider the Act's clear support for increasing competi-
tion and consumer involvement in the health planning process. Id. at 490-92.
1999I
416 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 8:389
district courts need to look at what remedy was ultimately provided in
these APA-related cases. In the above case, the Tenth Circuit compelled
the agency to accept the plaintiff s application, 179 but it did not order the
agency to approve the application. In declining to order approval of the
application, the court respected the separation of power principles under-
lying federal administrative mandamus practice, 180 which are analogous
to the principles that should guide federal courts in their review of local
zoning decisions. Instead, the courts have historically chosen to instruct
"agencies to explain or reconsider their decisions not to act."''s
Courts contemplating issuing a writ or order under section 332(c)(7)
also cite the extra time that remand entails and note that such delays in
approving applications may be unreasonable. 182 Under section 706(1),
the courts have adopted a multi-factor balancing test that conveys the
"hexagonal contours" of the considerations necessary to determine
whether an agency's delay is in fact unreasonable. 183 Whether the duty
to resolve proceedings without unreasonable delay is inherent in any reg-
ulatory statute, 184 or express as in the instant statute, agencies are none-
theless afforded "considerable deference in establishing a timetable for
completing [their] proceedings."' 185 On the other hand, agencies must
consider that excessive delays may undermine public confidence, foster
uncertainty for the parties involved, thwart the right to judicial review or
cripple the statutory scheme. 18 6 The TRAC court cited several factors to
consider when assessing the reasonability of a delay:
(1) the agency's pace of decision must follow a "rule of
reason;" (2) the agency's enabling statute may provide a
timetable to give substance to this "rule of reason;" (3)
delays are less tolerable when human health and welfare
are at stake than when commercial concerns are in-
volved; (4) expediting delayed agency action should not
adversely affect the agency's ability to act on proceed-
ings of a higher or competing priority; (5) the nature and
extent of the interests prejudiced by delay should be con-
179 See id. at 492.
18O See Miaskoff, supra note 162, at 647. Miaskoff argues that the court appropriately
demurred on the plaintiff's request to rule on the merits of the case and in avoiding taking
control of the substantive administrative discretion left to the agency. See id.
181 Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HArrv. L. Rnv. 507, 563-
65 (1985).
182 See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
183 Telecommunications Research & Action Center (TRAC) v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
184 See Miaskoff, supra note 162, at 651.
185 Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining TRAC).
186 See id. (collecting cases).
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sidered; and (6) impropriety is not essential to a finding
of unreasonable delay. 187
No district courts contemplating remedial action under section
332(c)(7) have considered adopting these factors, instead choosing to
rely on state land use decisions and/or the holdings of prior courts.' 88
The courts frequently also overlook Congress' stated expectation that
tower permit applications are still subject to generally applicable
timeframes for local review.'8 9
In cases arising under section 332(c)(7), nothing but commercial
interests are at stake, for which lengthy delays are generally considered
acceptable under the APA.190 For every case that considers the effect on
statutory intent and addresses concerns that the locality will never seri-
ously consider the application,' 9 ' there is a case that conclusorily deter-
mines that remand would simply "serve no useful purpose."'1 92 This
haphazard approach raises questions as to whether Congress' intent is
being effectuated. The hesitancy reflected in the section 706(1) cases
discussed above reflects a real concern for separation of powers and the
maintenance of agencies' administrative independence. Section
332(c)(7) cases should also display heightened sensitivity to these issues,
especially given the federalism concerns implicated by the inter-sover-
eign review established under the Act.
CONCLUSION
While some argue that unimpeded "nationwide distribution of infor-
mation, competitive prices, and the increasing development of more ser-
vice helps all of us,'u 93 the historical respect held for the preservation of
187 Miaskoff, supra note 162, at 652 (citing TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80).
188 See supra Part M (discussing cases).
189 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, 104th Cong., at 208 (1996).
190 See Miaskoff, supra note 162, at 655 (citing MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC,
627 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that delay in evaluating tariff only became unreasona-
ble after a delay of four years), and Potomac Electric Power Co. v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026 (10th
Cir. 1983), (holding that a nine-year delay in approving train rates was unreasonable)).
191 See Western PCS II Corp. v. Santa Fe, 957 F. Supp. 1230 (D.N. Mex. 1997).
192 Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 497 (2d Cir. 1999). The
Second Circuit came to this conclusion and affirmed the order compelling issuance of "the
special permits and any other permits" necessary to construct the facility, despite the fact that
the plaintiff had not yet completed the necessary filings ordinarily reviewed by the town. L
193 Kratofil, supra note 6, at 516; see also Aegerter v. City of Delafield, No. 98-2422,
1999 U.S. App. Lexis 7493, *16 (7th Cir. Apr. 19, 1999) (noting that "[s]ome may disagree
with Congress' decision to leave so much authority in the hands of state and local governments
to affect the placement of the physical infrastructure of an important part of the nation's evolv-
ing telecommunications network"); Littlejohn, supra note 36, at 260 ("The scope of the federal
interest involved-the economic and general welfare of the country-is broad indeed. When
local zoning regulation prevents construction of a cell site, that local regulation should be
preempted.").
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local control and decision making is not one that should be overrun so
quickly. I do not advocate a harsh anti-federalist view, nor do I advocate
a rejection of dazzling new technologies. The approach chosen by Con-
gress "does not offer a single 'cookie cutter' solution for diverse local
situations, and it imposes an unusual burden on the courts."' 194 In doing
so, this approach exacerbates the conflict, ignores the significant federal-
ism concerns discussed above, and makes ideologues of all the players.
The FCC and a frustrated wireless industry have realized what Congress
did not: local zoning is akin to a third-rail of the growing federalism
debate in this country. As such, in August 1998, wireless providers and
local governments came to an agreement, mediated by the FCC's Local
and State Government Advisory Committee ("LSGAC"), that incorpo-
rates some of the alternative solutions that Congress should have adopted
in the bill itself, or at least directed the FCC to promulgate regulations
on.195 The agreement includes two initiatives that establish guidelines
for facilities siting implementation and, most importantly, establishes an
informal dispute resolution process that permits the protagonists to work
together for a solution. 196 While these are critical steps toward resolving
the disputes, the agreement is non-binding and, considering the risks and
awards at stake, is unlikely to be the panacea desired by the FCC and
other parties. Additionally, as the First Circuit recognized, while "Con-
gress conceived that [section 332(c)(7)] would produce ... individual
solutions best adapted to the needs and desires of particular communities,
if this refreshing experiment in federalism does not work, Congress can
always alter the law.' 9' 97
Recognizing the impact of a massive telecommunications roll-out,
Congress tried to strike a balance between the future of communications
and the historical and recently rejuvenated sense of community that has
become increasingly important in the encroaching ether of global, mo-
bile, keystroke telecommunications. By providing only skeletal guidance
and federal review of local zoning decisions, 198 Congress left the judici-
ary to sift through the various and oft conflicting policies underlying the
federalism debate that come to a head in regulating the location of wire-
less facilities. Left to their own devices, the courts have largely become
194 Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, No. 98-2061, 1999 WL
174253, at *8 (1st Cir. March 30, 1999).
195 See Chairman William E. Kennard Announces Historic Agreement By Local and State
iGovernments and Wireless Industries on Facilities Siting Issues, FCC Press Release (Aug. 5,
1998) <http://www.fcc.gov>.
196 See id.
197 Town of Amherst, No. 98-2061, 1999 WL 174253, at *8.
198 Some commentators argue that legislative clarification by Congress is the best route to
follow. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 7, at 500.
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a federal zoning board by usurping power from the local communities
that they have been charged to protect.
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